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Quantum cryptography with polarizing interferometers
Marek Czachor
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Politechnika Gdan´ska, ul. Narutowicza 11/12, 80-952 Gdan´sk, Poland
Cryptographic scheme proposed by Bennett, Brassard, and
Mermin [Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992)] is reformulated
in a version involving two polarizing Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometers. Such a form, although physically equivalent to the
original one, makes its security explicit, suggestive and easy
to explain to non-experts.
PACS number: 03.65 Bz
In the Ekert cryptographic scheme (E91) [1] pairs of
EPR particles were used to generate identical sequences
of bits in remote places, while Bell’s theorem certified
that the particles were not measured in transit by an
eavesdropper. The modification of the Ekert scheme pro-
posed by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin (BBM92) [2]
did not use the Bell theorem and was based essentially
on the fact that two particles correlated by a singlet state
behave similarly to a single particle. A user of the crypto-
graphic channel, traditionally called Alice or Bob, instead
of sending a polarized particle through the channel, may
make a measurement of polarization of his or her particle
and somehow “create” an appropriately polarized object
at the other side of the channel. In this way the BBM92
protocol becomes a kind of the original Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [3] but with “polarization at a dis-
tance” [4].
Quantum cryptography based on entangled states is
an ingenious practical application of the set of ideas and
techniques that were originally developed in order to un-
derstand the problem of completeness and limitations of
quantum mechanics. Another such application, equally
amazing and simultaneously very simple, is the idea of
interaction-free measuerements proposed by Elitzur and
Vaidman (EV) [5]. Below I will discuss the latter in some
detail since the objective of this Letter is to show that
combining the ideas of BBM92 and EV one arrives at
a particularly suggestive version of a quantum crypto-
graphic scheme. The scheme can be formally shown to
be secure by a direct application of the proof given in
BBM92. What is interesting, however, its security is
so explicit that an explanation of the problem to non-
experts becomes particularly simple. As opposed to the
standard schemes one can illustrate the point without
referring to technical aspects such as complementarity,
non-cloning theorem, or Bell’s theorem with all its loop-
holes.
Let us begin with the EV experiment. It is based on
the Mach-Zehnder interferometer consisting of two iden-
tical semi-transparent symmetric mirrors (Fig. 1). The
action of such mirrors can be described by 2× 2 unitary
maps
|ψ〉in 7→ U |ψ〉in = |ψ〉out. (1)
Using a matrix notation one can write U as a 2×2 unitary
matrix, say,
(
ψ1 out
ψ2 out
)
=
1√
2
(
i 1
1 i
)(
ψ1 in
ψ1 in
)
. (2)
An essential ingredient of the interferometer is the pi/2
phase shift occuring between the transmitted beams: For
ψ1 in = 1, ψ2 in = 0 (i.e. |ψ〉in = |1〉in) one finds
U |1〉in = 1√
2
(
i|1〉out + |2〉out
)
. (3)
The fact that the two mirrors are identical implies that
the twice-transmitted beam is shifted by pi with respect
to the beam which is twice-reflected. And vice versa:
The beam that has been reflected at the first mirror and
then transmitted at the second one, has the same phase
as the beam that has been first transmitted and then re-
flected. An interference between the upper and the lower
paths results finally in a completely destructive interfer-
ence in the “1-out” port and a completely constructive
interference in the “2-out” port. Formally this looks as
follows
U2|1〉in = i|2〉out (4)
or U2 = iσx. Now, without going into formal details, it is
clear that had we closed one of the paths in the interfer-
ometer, the interference pattern would be destroyed and,
independently of the choice of |ψ〉in, the output probabil-
ities would be 1/2. In this way a detection in the “1-out”
port of a single photon may signal a presence of an ob-
stacle in one of the paths even though there is no transfer
of energy to the obstacle. This is the essence of the EV
interaction-free measurement.
The cryptographic scheme I will describe below is
based on a similar property of a polarizing Mach-Zehnder
interferometer (Fig. 1a). A detailed theory of such a de-
vice was presented in [6] and the configuration of the
cryptographic channel was inspired by the beautiful in-
terferometric version of the EPR problem proposed by
Z˙ukowski and Pykacz [7].
The interferometer we will concentrate on is called po-
larizing because the first semi-transparent mirror is re-
placed by an analyzer of circular polarizations (denoted
U±): A right-handed beam incoming through the “1-in”
1
port is reflected and goes “up”, whereas a left-handed
beam goes through the device unchanged. To get a close
analogy with the EV problem we assume that the phase
shifts between the two beams that leave the analyzer are
identical to those generated by U [compare (3)]:
U±
(
A|1+〉in + B|1−〉in
)
= iA|1+〉out +B|2−〉out. (5)
It is clear that a recombination of the two beams will
not lead to any interference between the two paths of
the interferometer because the two beams have different
circular polarizations. Therefore before we recombine the
two beams at a semi-transparent mirror, we first turn
the left-handed beam into a right-handed one by means
of a half-wave plate which is placed at the lower path of
the interferometer. Such an interferometer can be used
to make an interaction-free measurement if one takes a
linearly polarized state (polarization along an x-axis)
|ψ〉in = 1√
2
(
|1−〉in + |1+〉in
)
= |1x〉in (6)
as the input. Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, the
entire interferometer maps |1x〉in into i|2+〉out. Analo-
gously, a y-polarized state
|1y〉in = 1√
2
(
|1−〉in − |1+〉in
)
(7)
is transformed into |1+〉out (note that all these states are
right-handed). The one-to-one relationship between the
linear polarization states of the input and the appropri-
ate “out” ports will be lost if some obstacle will close
one path of the interferometer: An obstacle at the lower
path removes a left-handed component from the incom-
ing beam; an obstacle at the upper path removes a right-
handed component. The effect of the obstacle is therefore
equivalent to putting a circular polarization filter at the
input of the interferometer. I point out this element to
show that the one-to-one relationship we have just men-
tioned is physically equivalent to the EV effect. However,
this is not what we are interested in here. What is impor-
tant, the “EV effect” turns our polarizing interferometer
into an analyzer of linear polarizations, a property of cru-
cial importance for the cryptographic procedure.
Before we proceed further let us first make our discus-
sion more formal. The Hilbert space of the input is now
4-dimensional (two output ports and two polarization
states in each port makes four “out” states; by unitarity
we must have also four “in” states). It is instructive to
consider an interferometer with an arbitrary phase shift
α. A state will be written in the circular polarisation
basis:
|ψ〉 =


ψ1+
ψ1
−
ψ2+
ψ2
−

 . (8)
The four parts of the interferometer are
U± =


i 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0

 (polarizing beam splitter) (9)
Uλ/2 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

 (half wave plate) (10)
Uα =


eiα 0 0 0
0 eiα 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 (phase shifter) (11)
U =
1√
2


i 0 1 0
0 i 0 1
1 0 i 0
0 1 0 i

 (symmetricmirror) (12)
and the entire interferometer is
Vα = UUαUλ/2U± =
1√
2


−eiα 1 0 0
0 0 ieiα 1
ieiα i 0 0
0 0 eiα i

 . (13)
The fact that Vα is an analyzer of linear polarizations
can be seen in the formulas
V †α |1+〉out =
−1√
2
(
e−iα|1+〉in − |1−〉in
)
(14)
V †α |1−〉out =
−i√
2
(
e−iα|2+〉in + i|2−〉in
)
(15)
V †α |2+〉out =
−i√
2
(
e−iα|1+〉in + |1−〉in
)
(16)
V †α |2−〉out =
1√
2
(
e−iα|2+〉in − i|2−〉in
)
. (17)
Of special importance for us are the folmulas (14) and
(16) since they explicitly show the linear polarization ba-
sis analyzed by Vα. We shall rewrite these formulas as a
definition of the new basis:
i|2+〉out = Vα|α〉in (18)
−|1+〉out = Vα|α⊥〉in. (19)
In particular, |0〉in = |1x〉in and |0⊥〉in = −|1y〉in. Let
us recall that the interferometer acts as the analyzer of
linear polarizations as a result of the interference between
the two circular polarizations: For any linearly polarized
input state its different circular components propagate
by different paths and interfere due to the presence of
the half-wave plate.
Consider now a source producing either of the following
two entangled states (Fig. 2).
|Ψ±
in
〉 = 1√
2
(
|1+〉in|1−〉in ± |1−〉in|1+〉in
)
(20)
2
where the circular polarization states correspond to pho-
tons propagating to the “left” and to the “right”, respec-
tively. Switching to the linear polarization basis we find
that
|Ψ+in〉 =
eiα√
2
(
|α〉in|α〉in − |α⊥〉in|α⊥〉in
)
(21)
|Ψ−
in
〉 = e
iα
√
2
(
|α⊥〉in|α〉in − |α〉in|α⊥〉in
)
(22)
and, since the formula is valid for any α, we obtain two
EPR-type states with entangled linear polarizations (par-
allel for |Ψ+
in
〉 and perpendicular for |Ψ−
in
〉). On the other
hand, both states have maximally entangled circular po-
larizations. The entanglement of linear polarizations to-
gether with the analyzer-of-linear polarizations property
of Vα explain the origin of violation of the Bell inequality
in a coincidence experiment with the state Vα⊗ Vβ |Ψ±in〉.
To give an example, one finds
〈Ψ+
in
|V †α ⊗ V †β |P (1+)out ⊗ P (1+)out|Vα ⊗ Vβ |Ψ+in〉
= 〈Ψ+in|V †α ⊗ V †β |P (2+)out ⊗ P (2+)out|Vα ⊗ Vβ |Ψ+in〉
=
1
2
cos2
α− β
2
(23)
where the P ’s are projectors corresponding to the outputs
of the two interferometers. In particular, for α = β one
obtains the perfect coincidence of detections. It is easy
to understand this effect when we recall that for |Ψ+
in
〉 the
linear polarizations of both photons are the same inde-
pendently of the choice of the polarization plane and that
the phase of the interferometer determines the plane of
polarization analyzed by the interferometer. However, in
a realistic experiment the result of the form (23) will hold
approximately since for either α or β nonzero the above
formulas are valid for purely monochromatic fields. An
efficiency will be maximal only for α = β = 0. The above
arrangement is therefore naturally suited for the EPR-
type cryptography discussed by Bennett in [4] where the
polarizations involved are linear-x, linear-y, left-handed
and right-handed.
Assume Alice and Bob choose interferometers with no
phase shifts (i.e. with equal lengths of the paths, simi-
larly to the EV experiment, Fig. 1b) and a source pro-
ducing
|Ψ+
in
〉 = 1√
2
(
|1x〉in|1x〉in − |1y〉in|1y〉in
)
(24)
=
1√
2
(
|1+〉in|1−〉in + |1−〉in|1+〉in
)
(25)
and consider the four experiments symbolically denoted
by
V0 ⊗ V0 (26)
V0 ⊗ U± (27)
U± ⊗ V0 (28)
U± ⊗ U± (29)
In (26) Alice and Bob both measure linear polarizations;
in (27) Alice measures a linear polarization but Bob mea-
sures a circular one, and so on. Each of them chooses
between V0 and U± at random. The cryptographic key is
produced, for example, when they both measure circular
polarizations [i.e. (29)] but the test for eavesdropping is
performed by comparison of data collected in (26) and a
part of those from (29).
It is easy to show that the scheme is secure. Indeed,
Eve in order to get an information about the key has to
measure circular polarizations. After a measurement she
sends to Alice and Bob appropriately polarized photons,
say, |1−〉in|1+〉in. But Alice and Bob test for eavesdrop-
ping by measuring linear polarizations. The perfect cor-
relations in the V0 ⊗ V0 experiment are due to the “EV
effect”, that is are present if and only if each of the pho-
tons goes by both paths in the interferometer . However,
whenever Eve sends photons that are circularly polar-
ized, the photons propagate by only one path in the in-
terferometers (a similar effect would be obtained if Eve
had closed the upper path in Alice’s interferometer and
the lower path in Bob’s one). The reason is obvious:
A right-handed photon is with certainty reflected by U±
and goes by the upper path, and the left-handed one
is with certainty transmitted by U± and goes through
the lower path. There is absolutely no way of sending
a photon that with certainty would go by only one path
and simultaneously by both paths. However, a part of
data for measurements of circular polarizations must be
also checked for coincidence to avoid the following rather
nasty attack. Eve measures circular polarizations for all
pairs, but then sends to Alice and Bob identical linear
polarized photons. They check for eavesdropping and do
not discover anything. Alice encodes the secret informa-
tion according to the one-time pad procedure, but when
it turns out that Bob cannot decode the information it
is already too late since Eve knows the message. When
they sacrifice a part of the possible key data they very
quickly discover there is no perfect correlation in circular
polarizations.
To formally prove the security one simply repeats the
steps from BBM92 and substitutes circular polarizations
for measurements of σz and the linear ones for those of
σx.
The procedure I propose is equivalent to BBM92, E91,
and BB84. However, I believe it is much more intuitive
and easier to explain to those who are not profession-
ally involved in investigation of foundations of quantum
mechanics. It clearly shows the analyzer-of-linear polar-
izations property of the polarizing Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer. The latter feature is very paradoxical in itself
and can be used to prove a simple Bell-type theorem for
a single photon [6].
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FIG. 1. (a) Polarizing Mach-Zehnder interferometer. U± is
an analyzer of circular polarizations, U a symmetric lossless
beam splitter, λ/2 a half-wave plate, and β a phase shifter.
The upper paths are labelled “1” and the lower ones “2”. U±
is fully transparent for left-handed photons and fully reflect-
ing for the right-handed ones if they arrive through the “1-in”
port. The properties of the analyzer with respect to the pho-
tons arriving through the “2-in” port are irrelevant from the
viewpoint of our discussion. (b) Ordinary Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer used in the Elitzur-Vaidman experiment. The
beam of light arriving through the “1-in” port leaves through
the “2-out” port.
FIG. 2. An experiment Vα⊗Vβ. Alice (left) and Bob (right)
measure linear polarizations of photons arriving in a singlet
state. The polarization planes are determined by the phases
of the interferometers. The experiment U± ⊗U± corresponds
to the situation where instead if recombining the beams at U
the detectors are placed directly behind U±.
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